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The defendants respectfully submit this brief in objection 
to plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the questions presented by petitioner are of the 
character and scope necessary to be considered by the Utah 
Supreme Court on Certiorari or whether they are unique to this 
case and fact specific, thus not entitling petitioner to a Writ 
of Certiorari under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
2. Is an expert witness a surprise witness where: 
(a) The expert withdraws as a witness because he perceives 
plaintiff's conduct as threatening his personal safety as well as 
the safety of his family; (b) After reassessing this risk, the 
expert changes his mind and agrees to testify, and notice is 
given to opposing counsel within ten days prior to trial as 
agreed by the parties and ordered by the court in the pretrial 
order; (c) A written report is prepared and delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel as requested by counsel during the hearing on 
the Motion in Limine and ordered by the court; (d) No objection 
was made by plaintiff's counsel when the expert is called to 
testify; (e) Plaintiff's counsel conducts an extensive cross 
examination in an area in which he is personally familiar; and 
(f) The expert is called to testify 22 days after plaintiff's 
counsel is given notice. 
3. If the above-described expert is a surprise witness, did 
the decision by the Court of Appeals in this matter nullify or 
damage the Rules of Civil Procedure and the laws of discovery to 
allow parties to spring surprise witnesses on opposing counsel 
immediately prior to trial and thereby prejudice opposing 
parties? 
4. Do the facts of this case and its disposition at the 
Court of Appeals support plaintiff's attempt to have this Court 
modify the waiver doctrine? 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The controlling statutes are attached in the Addendum to 
this Brief as exhibit "A" and by reference made a part hereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, alleging personal 
injuries resulting from a two-vehicle accident which occurred on 
June 15, 1984. Plaintiff alleged he suffered a "closed head 
brain injury" and a low back injury. The plaintiff was seeking 
damages in the amount of $1,152,498.79. (R. 145) 
The action was the subject of a jury trial on February 2nd 
to February 17, 1987. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
plaintiff finding that the defendant Bates was 75% at fault in 
the causing of the accident and determining that plaintiff had 
suffered damages totaling $16,850.00. The damages awarded to 
plaintiff were reduced by 25% by reason of the negligence 
attributed to plaintiff by the jury. (R. 658-660) 
Plaintiff's motions for a new trial or for an additur were 
denied by the trial court. (R. 715) 
Plaintiff appealed from the judgment on the jury verdict and 
from the order denying the motion for a new trial or for additur. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
The court reversed the special verdict attributing 25% of the 
total negligence to the plaintiff, finding that the evidence did 
not support such a finding, and remanded the case for entry of 
judgment consistent therewith. (The case is reported at Onyeabor 
v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990)). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court on all other 
issues. First, it rejected plaintiff's claim of judicial bias, 
finding as follows: 1) that the plaintiff never filed an 
affidavit as required by Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 2) that the plaintiff failed to make contemporaneous 
objections to the court's comments. The Court of Appeals pointed 
out that, while reluctance to make frequent objections is 
understandable, the court could not find even one such 
contemporaneous objection on the record; 3) that plaintiff did 
not file a motion for a mistrial; and 4) that there was nothing 
to contradict the defendants' observations that the judge's 
remarks at issue were simply explanatory and for the purposes of 
clarification. (Onyeabor, 787 P.2d at 526-28.) 
Second, the Court of Appeals decided that the plaintiff's 
claim that Dr. Clark was a surprise witness was without merit, 
finding that Dr. Clark had been identified 12 days before trial, 
that plaintiff's counsel was familiar with him, and that the 
subject matter and substance of his testimony was contained in a 
report delivered to plaintiff as required by the lower court. 
The Court of Appeals also found that, even if it was error to 
admit his testimony, the plaintiff was not preiudiced therebv. 
(Id, at 528-29) 
The plaintiff/petitioner, now petitions this Court for Writ 
of Certiorari on the issues of judicial bias and the admission of 
Dr. Clark's expert testimony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Comment on the evidence: In response to petitioner's 
assertion in his statement of facts that the judge made numerous 
prejudicial comments on the evidence and exhibited a prejudicial 
attitude toward the plaintiff and his counsel through the court's 
demeanor and conduct of the trial, the defendants assert that the 
comments at issue were appropriate and not prejudicial. Instead, 
many of the comments could be characterized as explanatory and 
others were made in an attempt to clarify the evidence elicited 
and limit it to those things which were relevant to the issues 
before the jury. 
The latter was especially necessary as the case was tried on 
February 2, through February 17, 1987, for a total of 11 trial 
days. During the course of the trial, 33 witnesses testified; 20 
of them as experts. Of the total witnesses, plaintiff called 26, 
of whom 15 were experts. Additionally, 108 of 113 offered 
exhibits were plaintiff's. One hundred six exhibits were 
admitted into evidence. Plaintiff's case in chief lasted from 
February 2nd until the morning of February 12, 1987. Virtually 
all of the testimony and exhibits sought to be admitted by 
plaintiff were admitted during the course of trial such that 
plaintiff's claims were fully and completely presented to the 
jury. Because the list of plaintiff's specific allegations with 
regard to the claimed direct comments is so lengthy, the 
defendants have not included their responses to each in the body 
of this brief• Instead, for the Court's convenience and 
information, defendants1 specific responses to each of the 
allegedly biased comments are included in the Addendum to this 
brief as Exhibit "B" and by reference made a part hereof. 
Lincoln Clark, M.D, as a Witness: Defendants1 amended 
witness and exhibit list containing Dr. Clark's name was filed 
and served on January 21, 1987. The proposed pretrial order 
signed by both counsel on November 6, 1986, (R. 228-248) provided 
that at least ten days prior to trial, each party would serve 
upon opposing counsel a list of all v/itnesses who would or might 
be called at trial. (R. 246) . The order did provide the list 
should be mailed at least 13 days prior to trial to insure that 
opposing counsel would receive it at least 11 days prior to 
trial. Plaintiff's counsel acknowledges receiving that list on 
January 22, ten days prior to trial. (App. brief to the Court of 
Appeals pg. 80). 
Defendants concede that at a hearing on December 5, 1986, 
Dr. Clark stated he would not testify in the action. At that 
hearing, Dr. Clark stated that after examining the plaintiff and 
based upon his professional experience, including testimony in 
major criminal and in several commitment hearings, the plaintiff 
constituted a threat to him, his family, to defendant Bates and 
to Dr. Thomas Houts and that Dr. Clark's appearance as a witness 
at trial opposing the plaintiff would place himself and his wife 
in physical jeopardy (T. S. 4-10; S 13-15). Subsequent events 
caused Dr. Clark to determine that he could appear as a witness 
in the case without exposing himself to an unreasonable risk of 
harm. (T. L. 124-29). Plaintiff's counsel also perceived the 
potential risk of harm to Dr. Clark as is indicated by a series 
of questions and answers in which Mr. Sykes phoned a warning to 
Dr. Clark after receiving a phone call from plaintiff's wife. 
(T. L. 132-33). 
The plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a 
witness was heard by the trial judge on the Friday before trial, 
January 30, 1987. The judge concluded that if the defendants 
provided the plaintiff with a written report, he would permit Dr. 
Clark to testify. (T. Q. 49-50). 
A copy of Dr. Clark's written report relating to his 
examination and evaluation of the plaintiff was delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel on Wednesday, February 4, 1987, at 9:30 a.m. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not thereafter attempt to depose or 
interview Dr. Clark. No objection was made by the plaintiff when 
Dr. Clark was called to testify on February 13, 1987, 22 days 
after plaintiff first received notice that Dr. Clark would 
testify. 
At trial, plaintiff's counsel conducted a lengthy cross 
examination of Dr. Clark. A review of the transcript (Vol. L.) 
reveals the cross examination fills nearly 100 pages (compared 
to 44 pages for direct examination) and occupies substantially 
all of the afternoon session of February 13, 1987. During the 
course of cross examination, plaintiff's counsel tested the 
credibilitv of the witness utilizing Dr. Clark's transcribed 
testimony taken during the trial of another closed head brain 
injury case in which both plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Clark were 
involved. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND ITS DISPOSITION ON 
APPEAL DO 
A REVIEW 
ISSUE OF 
NOT 
OF 
SUPPORT PLAINTIFF 
THE DOCTRINE OF 
SUFFICIENT CHARACTER 
"S CLAIM THAT 
WAIVER IS 
AND SCOPE 
AN 
TO 
WARRANT CERTIORARI 
The plaintiff seeks a Writ of Certiorari to review two 
issues decided by the Court of Appeals, and he seeks to establish 
that they are compelling issues which must be addressed by this 
Court as far reaching issues of procedure and policy. Quite 
simply, they are not. 
In petitioner's first question presented for review, he 
seeks to have this Court reconsider the doctrine of waiver. He 
argues that an attorney should not be required to object to 
prejudicial comments and conduct by a trial judge where those 
comments and conduct are too numerous and too pervasive so as to 
make repeated objections prejudicial to that attorney's case. In 
support of his attempt to have this Court review the doctrine of 
waiver, the petitioner cites 35 specific examples of prejudicial 
comments by Judge Croft. 
The petitioner then argues that the decision by the Court of 
Appeals that petitioner's claim of judicial bias was without 
merit was an excessively strict, inflexible application of the 
doctrine of waiver such as to warrant this Court's review. 
The facts and the decision bv the Court of Appeals do not 
support petitioner's position. 
Each of the specific comments and conduct singled out by the 
petitioner here were raised in and reviewed by the Court of 
Appeals, They include: 1) direct comments on the evidence; 2) 
sua sponte interjections by the trial judge; and 3) the demeanor 
and other non-verbal conduct of the trial judge. Rather than 
address each of these three classes individually and specifically 
at this time, the defendants shall limit their response to the 
issue of whether the decision by the Court of Appeals warrants 
review by this Court and is therefore of the magnitude to warrant 
certiorari. However, included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit 
"B" is defendants1 argument addressing each of the plaintiff's 
specific allegations as to judicial bias. To the extent 
necessaryf it is incorporated by reference. 
The petitioner's arguments as to judicial bias and the 
identical comments included by plaintiff in his Tables 1 and II 
were reviewed by the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
dismissed the petitioner's claim of judicial bias as being 
without merit. However, contrary to plaintiff's assertions, this 
decision was based on several grounds, and not solely on 
plaintiff's failure to object to each. First, the petitioner 
failed to file an affidavit of bias as provided for in Rule 36(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While the Court of Appeals 
pointed out that this was not the sole infirmity of the 
petitioner's claim, it cited the case of Madsen v. Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) for the 
principle that motions to disqualify must be made promptly and 
may not be delayed so as to appear that they are filed only when 
rulings are unfavorable. The Onyeabor panel of the court quoted 
the Madsen case and stated: "'Not only is such a tactic unfair, 
but it may evidence a belief that the judge is not in fact 
biased.'" (Onyeabor, 787 P.2d at 527 fn. 1, quoting Madsen, 767 
P.2d at 542). 
Specifically addressing the petitioner's claim now at issue 
before this Utah Supreme Court that counsel should not be 
expected to object to every prejudicial comment, the Court of 
Appeals noted that the petitioner had in fact objected to none! 
The Court of Appeals stated: 
Although reluctance to make frequent 
objections may be understandable, we fail to 
find in the portions of the record provided 
by plaintiff even one such contemporaneous 
objection. Nor can we find any motion made 
by plaintiff for a mistrial. 
Onyeabor, 787 P.2d at 527. 
In the Court of Appeals, as here, the petitioner had relied 
on the singular passage on day three of the trial where the trial 
judge explained that the petitioner had objected in chambers to 
his conduct. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the need to 
make a record applies to conferences in chambers as well as 
courtroom proceedings and that the burden was the plaintiff's to 
preserve the record for a possible appeal. 
The Court of Appeals then addressed the lower court's 
comments on plaintiff's objection made in chambers, but the Court 
of Appeals cited the entire passage. The entire passage is 
important as it includes the trial judge's response to 
You have made mention of the fact . . . that 
some of your witnesses sitting in the 
courtroom told you that it was obvious that 
the judge didn't like you. Well, again if 
they got that impression, I'm sorry, because 
that isn't true. . . . 
But you go on in your brief stressing the 
fact that my conduct throughout the trial 
gave the jury a powerful message that your 
methods were time consuming, meaningless, 
perhaps an attempt to put something over on 
the jury. That surprised me. . . . And you 
suggest that my conduct, by the tone of my 
voice, by the shrug of my shoulders, by a 
sigh, gave a powerful message to the jury 
that I didn't think much of your case, and I 
was trying to hurry the case along and not 
willing to give you a fair shake. . . . The 
only way I can respond to that sort of 
indictment of the Court's conduct at the 
trial is by saying I plead not guilty. . . . 
I deny that throughout the trial I did things 
intentionally or unintentionally to discredit 
you or your witnesses or to the face of the 
JurY-
Id. at 527. (emphasis added) Thus the court denied that its 
conduct was prejudicial on day three of the trial, and the 
petitioner never raised a subsequent objection in the remaining 
eight days of trial. 
Finally, in dismissing petitioner's claim of judicial bias 
as being without merit, the Court of Appeals also relied on the 
fact that there was a jury instruction which cautioned the jurors 
that anything done or said by the judge during the trial should 
not be considered by the jurors as indicating the judge's view on 
any issue in the case. Specifically, Jury Instruction No. 2 
stated as follows: 
Anything done or said by me during the trial 
should not be considered by you as indicating 
my view on any issue in this case. Any 
belief you may have as to what my view may be 
should receive no consideration by you in 
your deliberations. 
Therefore, the decision that the petitioner's claim was 
without merit was based on several grounds and a review of all 
comments in context of the entire record. Not only did the 
plaintiff's counsel fail to object to any comments on the record, 
he also failed to file an affidavit of prejudice as soon as it 
allegedly became apparent that the judge disliked the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff's case. The judge himself addressed 
plaintiff's concerns and denied all allegations of bias as well 
as instructing the jury to disregard any beliefs they had as to 
the judge's opinion of the case. 
From the entire record, then, the Court of Appeals could 
only conclude that: "There is nothing to contradict defendants' 
observation that the questioned remarks were 'simply explanatory 
statements made by the Court either in the course of ruling on 
objections, or limiting the admissibility of evidence or 
testimony, or clarifying the testimony given by a witness.'" Id. 
at 528. 
This conclusion and the dismissal of plaintiff's claim of 
bias was therefore not an inflexible and overly strict 
application of the doctrine of waiver as the petitioner would 
argue. It was, instead, a reasoned approach to the specific 
facts of this case and the plaintiff's claims on appeal. As a 
result, the plaintiff's claim that this Court must review the 
doctrine of waiver is not of the character and scope necessary 
for this Court to grant plaintiff's Writ of Certiorari. It 
II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IN ALLOWING THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANTS' EXPERT, DR. 
LINCOLN CLARK, M.D. AS A RESULT, THE 
DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS 
REGARD DOES NOT LESSEN THE STANDARDS OF 
PRACTICE AMONG LITIGATING ATTORNEYS OR AFFECT 
THE PERCEIVED FAIRNESS OF THE SYSTEM. 
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DR. CLARK WAS 
A SURPRISE WITNESS IS NOT OF THE SCOPE AND 
CHARACTER NECESSARY FOR CERTIORARI 
The petitioner's argument that the decision by the Court of 
Appeals sanctioning the lower court's refusal to exclude the 
testimony of Dr. Lincoln Clark as a surprise witness somehow 
lessens the standards of practice among litigating attorneys. To 
emphasize his point, the petitioner claims we might as well tear 
out certain pages of the Rules of Civil Procedure because the 
Court of Appeals is refusing to enforce them. Hardly. 
The issue of exclusion of the testimony of a surprise 
witness is a fact-intensive issue on which a trial court has 
broad discretion. A decision will be overturned on appeal only 
for clear abuse of that discretion. 
Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
The party is under a duty seasonably to 
supplement his response with respect to any 
question directly addressed to . . . the 
identity of each person expected to be called 
as an expert witness at trial, the subject 
matter on which he is expected to testify, 
and the substance of his testimony. 
Rule 51(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the trial 
court to grant a new trial based on "accident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." 
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether or 
not to exclude testimony or to grant a new trial based on an 
alleged surprise witness. Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101, 443 
P.2d 916 (1968); Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977) (a 
ruling on a motion for a new trial will be overturned only for a 
clear abuse of discretion). 
In reviewing a trial court's use of such discretion, this 
Court has noted that, to overturn a trial court's ruling on a new 
trial requires a "clear transgression" of "reasonable bounds of 
discretion", and no such transgression exists where there is 
evidence to support the ruling. Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 
202 (Utah 1981) rev'd on other grounds. See also, Sturdivant v. 
Yale-New Haven Hospital, 476 A.2d at 1077. 
Beyond showing an abuse of discretion, the appellant must 
establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged "surprise" before 
the denial of a new trial will be overturned. See, Lembach, 639 
P.2d 197. See also, Acosta v. Superior Court, 146 Ariz. 437, 706 
P.2d 763 (1985) . 
The policy behind such rules is that the disclosure of the 
witnesses permits "the opposing party to prepare an effective 
cross-examination." Hoover v. United States Dept. of the 
Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 (5th Cir. 1980). Where this policy 
is not contravened, a so-called "surprise" witness has been 
allowed to testify. See, Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz. App. 101, 443 
P. 2d 916 (1968) (testimony allowed where appellant was given 
opportunity to depose witness prior to testimony). See 
also, Macshara v. Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P.2d 756 (1967), 
rev'd on other grounds, Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 
(Utah 1979) (not abuse to permit testimony not disclosed at 
pre-trial). 
Plaintiff contends that Lincoln Clark, M.D., a psychiatrist 
called to testify on behalf of defendants, was a surprise witness 
whose testimony was prejudicial to plaintiff. 
Conduct by plaintiff himself which was perceived by an 
experienced psychiatrist as threatening caused Dr. Clark to 
initially withdraw as an expert witness. Plaintiff's own counsel 
apparently perceived the threat as real as he called Dr. Clark to 
warn him of possible violence from plaintiff in an incident where 
plaintiff, in fact, appeared at the office of plaintiff's counsel 
and banged on counsel's desk with a cane. After reassessing the 
risk to his personal safety, Dr. Clark concluded that he could 
appear as a witness. Plaintiff was informed that Dr. Clark would 
be a witness more than ten days prior to trial. Dr. Clark's 
testimony did not occur until February 13, 1987, twenty-two days 
after plaintiff's counsel had notice that he would appear. 
Plaintiff's motion _in limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a 
witness was heard by the trial judge on the Friday before trial, 
January 30, 1987. At that time, Judge Croft indicated that he 
was inclined to permit Dr. Clark to testify and stated: 
[JUDGE CROFT]: I would say that if, during 
the course of the trial, you decide you want 
to call Dr. Clark then perhaps an opportunity 
for Mr. Sykes to interview him might be 
granted. 
MR. STEGALL: Okay. I would certainly be 
willing to inquire of Dr. Clark as to whether 
he could put together a written report prior 
to Monday or Tuesday. I don't know how 
feasible that is but I will certainly so 
inquire and if one can be prepared — 
JUDGE CROFT: One might say if he is going to 
testify then tell him we want a written 
report for the attorneys to have a look at. 
MR. SYKES: That's the least we should have, 
is a written report. 
JUDGE CROFT: So if you want to agree to try 
to get together to dictate a report and have 
it available to you Monday or Tuesday so you 
will both have it then I would say if you 
went to call him, why, I would permit him to 
do so. 
(T. Q49-50.) 
A copy of Dr. Clark's written report relating to his 
examination and evaluation of plaintiff was delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel on Wednesday, February 4, 1987, at 9:30 a.m. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not thereafter attempt to depose or 
interview Dr. Clark. No objection was made by plaintiff when Dr. 
Clark was called to testify on February 13, 1987. 
At trial, plaintiff's counsel conducted an able, aggressive 
and lengthy cross-examination of Dr. Clark. During the course of 
cross-examination, plaintiff's counsel tested the credibility of 
the witness utilizing Dr. Clark's transcribed testimony taken 
during the trial of another closed-head brain injury case in 
which both plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Clark were involved. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial 
court to exclude Dr. Clark as a witness. The witness's earlier 
withdrawal had been caused by plaintiff's own conduct. A seven 
page single-spaced typed report of the witness' examination and 
findings were furnished to plaintiff's counsel substantially in 
advance of the witness's testimony. Plaintiff's counsel had had 
the opportunity to test the demeanor, credentials and expertise 
of the witness in a prior legal proceeding. A cross examination 
performed by plaintiff's counsel reveals counsel's own 
substantial expertise in the field of brain injury which 
permitted him to make a full and informative cross-examination of 
the witness. 
Upon review the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner's 
claim that Dr. Clark was a surprise witness was without merit. 
The Court of Appeals found that the defendants had substantially 
complied with Rule 26(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court pointed out that Dr. Clark was identified twelve days 
before trial and that plaintiff's counsel was familiar with him 
from his testimony in other lawsuits. In addition, the Court 
noted that the subject matter and substance of the expert 
testimony was contained in the report delivered to plaintiff nine 
days before the doctor testified. Finally, the Court of Appeals 
found that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate how he was 
prejudiced, and absent prejudice and an adverse affect on the 
substantial rights of the parties, any error in the admission of 
evidence must be disregarded. 
The petitioner's attempt to categorize this decision as a 
crisis of procedure warranting certiorari is instead an attempt 
to have this Court decide whether, under the facts of this case, 
the lower court abused its discretion. Such an appellate review 
is case and fact specific and does not warrant certiorari. 
In support of his contention that courts generally refuse to 
allow surprise experts to testify in similar situations, the 
petitioner cites the case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, 433 F.Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In that case the 
defendant in an airline decompression case called a doctor to 
testify that petitioner's condition resulted from pre-existing 
causes. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the testimony on the 
grounds that he had no prior notice of the witness and on the 
grounds that the report furnished to him by the doctor did not 
contain any diagnosis as to pre-existing causes. The petitioner 
in this case points out that the trial judge excluded the 
testimony. 
However, this exclusion by the trial judge was overruled on 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in the case of DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 
F.2d 1193 (1978). In the appellate case, KLM asserted that the 
district court erred in excluding this expert's medical 
testimony. In reviewing the issue on appeal, the Third Circuit 
began by outlining the applicable standard of review and stated: 
The applicable standard of review to 
determine whether the district court abused 
its discretion in excluding testimony for 
failure to comply with pre-trial notice 
requirements was recently stated by the court 
in Meyers v. Penny Pack Woods, 559 F.2d 894 
(3rd Cir. 1977). In that case, this court 
reversed the district court's refusal to 
admit testimony of a witness not named in a 
pre-trial memoranda on the basis of four 
factors: 
1. the prejudice or surprise in fact of 
the party against whom excluded witnesses 
would have testified; 
2. the ability of that party to cure 
the prejudice; 
3. the extent to which waiver of the 
rule against calling unlisted witnesses would 
disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of 
the case or of other cases in the court; 
4. bad faith or willfulness in failing 
to comply with the court's order.' 
Id. at 904. Additionally, we noted the 
significance of the practical importance of 
the evidence excluded. Id. at 905. 
Examining the facts of this case in the light 
of our standard of review, we hold that the 
expert testimony should not have been 
excluded. It may be that KLM did not perform 
precisely to the pre-trial notice 
requirements, and we are sensitive to the 
district court's need to maintain control 
over the discovery process and a fair, 
orderly presentation of evidence. Yet, 
exclusion of evidence is a drastic sanction, 
v/hich must pass the strict Meyers test to be 
upheld. 
In the instant case, KLM's pleading and the 
pre-trial order giving notice that 
pre-existing medical infirmities would be 
part of the case gives little support to 
plaintiff's contention of surprise and 
prejudice. And even if plaintiff's counsel 
were surprised by who gave the testimony, he 
should not have been surprised by its 
substance. Further, Dr. Welch's testimony 
occasioned no disruption in the trial, nor 
was there any assertion that the defendant 
exercised bad faith. In view of these facts, 
and because of the critical importance of 
this evidence to defendant's case, we are 
constrained to hold that the district court's 
exclusion of Dr. Welch's testimony as to 
pre-existing medical infirmities was 
reversible error. 
Id. at 1201. (emphasis added and in original) 
Applying these principals to the case currently before this 
Court on Petition, not only is it clear that the lower court did 
not abuse its discretion - cle.i- -,.^ 4 * -•" decision . the 
Co- ' "• • oeal s has i \- oi ,- o • • :e 
e v i d e n t i a r y and p r o c e d u i IJ ;'* r e g a r d ! : ; J o u n , n s e w i t n e s s e s . Dr. 
Clark was i n c l u d e d 1^ ^ho p r e - 1 r i <] -)+-i .-P ^n.^ *r^ n l a i n t i f f 
L t 1 ^ . ' , , . _ > - : . -i. j . I ' i e 
p r e - t r i a l -:r-"j«iv .-. r e p o r t v.is d e J i v e r e d " - tr.e p l a i n t i f f which 
o u t l i n e d tile o " ' : ' ' ttsbt-imuiiy un cue u n n u aciy u i u n a i , n i n e 
days b e f o r e * , . ^ i u . was +r t e s t i f y , ^ i ^ w i n g t h e e n t i r e f a ^ u a l 
scenar i r . * u p , , t i : y : ff had ^ c i c e t la^ - i . - Ih rK w*o rr t e s t i f y 
*',! -Ie . . ; , , * • ^ . 
page / 3 oi :ns petition tna: :;: . Li^rK1* reappearance was 
"obviously concealed from the petitionee , " *'here i s no evidence 
to support sue! *arp allegation n; „ _; - .,"::, t: -, + ne 
defendants ',o v* - " i: :)ad rai- ^  Vhe basis f *: . r. 'lar Vs 
determinate LOI. mat d-sp itt- ;.- . Onyeabo;- * s conduct, ;.-• was not In 
personal risk, 
F i i I a 1 ] '} „, t h e p e t :i t i o n e r s e e k s t :: I: i a v e t l:i i s C o I 11 t r e d e t • * r n i i n e 
whether or i lot he was prejudiced by the testimony of Dr. Clark, 
:e; t h^ 1 r^^ ri — 'ha*- re wis prejudice b" defendants' "allure 
!i -r_ir. ic;- r \- contention :;tv tne report tailed to state a 
conclusion; and 4) inadequate cross examination. Plain4-* 'f •; 
arguments as to prejudice caused by the testimony o:. -,; . ,:iark 
are unsubstantiated allegations and generalities. The 
petitioner's «.• - :- • - * 'c:l re ss ji • -- . * ::d 
or how the outcome of the case was affected. General statements 
that evidence prejudiced a party are insufficient to establish 
such a conclusion in the absence of a showing that the outcome of 
the case was somehow affected thereby. 
Thus, once again, viewing the facts surrounding the decision 
on this issue in the lower court and the disposition of the issue 
in the Court of Appeals, it is clear that this is an ordinary 
case. The decision by the Court of Appeals cannot be viewed as 
drastically affecting established procedure and fairness in 
ongoing litigation or even as a drastic departure from the rules 
as they apply to this case. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 43 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, this issue does not 
represent an issue of the character and scope necessary for 
certiorari. Therefore, the petition should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues presented by the plaintiff, when viewed in the 
light of the facts in this case and the entirety of the decision 
by the Court of Appeals, are not of the character and scope 
necessary to grant certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
Therefore the petition should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this day of Ju 
WlLtTTAM A. STEGAEir; 
KIM M. LUHN 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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ADDENDIJf I 
EXHIBIT "A" 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
1. F -uies 01 the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 4 3 , Considerations governing review of ce:i : t iorai: :i 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not -\ 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only when there are 
special and important reasons therefor. The 
following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
(1) when a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another 
panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state 
or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this Courl:; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court. 
Pule f 1, :'tah Rules of f I*-'L1 Procedure 
):! s •.'. . . • . .•• i fi cat i on of a Judge. 
disqualification. 'Whenever a party 
to a:v;, j.jri'-n or proceeding, civil •'" r 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file 
an affidavit that the judge before whom such 
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any 
opposite party to the suit, such judgment 
shall proceed no further therein, except to 
call in another judge to hear and determine 
the matter. 
Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A 
party who has responded to a request for 
discovery with a response that was complete 
when made is under no duty to supplement his 
response to include information thereafter 
acquired, except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty 
seasonably to supplement his response 
with respect to any question directly 
addressed to (A) the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of 
discoverable matters, and (B) the 
identity of each person expected to be 
called as an expert witness at trial, 
the subject matter on which he is 
expected to testify, and the substance 
of his testimony. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions 
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes; 
(3) Accident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
ARGUMENT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PREJUDICE!, _ ij; • _ VL 
CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 
Addressing the speci !:^ - •• nd'ic- : \ an • its 
singled our. by petitioner as the basis for his argument that the 
judge •*.-•-• -.-.'; .-r--.-:- »^  1 ; -.is'-'i a q a m s t arm, Lne conduct and 
comments can be separated int. rsur categories, ,;iev incl :v : 
1. Direct comments on the evidence; 
2. Sua sponte m t er jncf ions b<< His trial judge; and 
The demeanor and other non-verbal conduct of tb^ +-r .; 
judge. 
Each (.) t1 these categories and t:he specif it: ccu'nisct a[ .sssse 
is addressed specifically below. In general, the defendants 
subirti 1 : t . •• - • ; — ,—-<- ,-.d comments of the trial court were 
appropriate .ir.-i not ;• r-.: ] adi cial. 
CLAIMED DIRECT COMMENTS 
1" ' • * ' ' iiurti on M^caHiuns lm i ng f he 
course of • . i- ' i n , , tsio * r : i ; judge made direct comments upon 
th.p evidence :\he portions of the trial transcrirt ror^ainir.g 
• . > laiirie •:-.: -. ;' . '--^ .ated itrms I • - ; 
Appendix to p l a i n t i f f s bri ; 
A re v: ~\i -•"• * th -^  s ° n-o r u •  ^ r ~ o -: - h ^  transcript i *~ s e 1 f (rather 
than plain •. : ; -•- .u^es » : . -.id: - • ..- . ga 
instances -'it,-,d by plaintiff are net comments on the evidence ba-' 
are .simply explanatory statements made by the court either in the 
course of ruling on objections, or limiting the admissibility of 
evidence or testimony, or clarifying the testimony given by a 
witness. Instances falling within this category are Table 1 and 
Appendix items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14. 
For example, as to Appendix item 2 plaintiff asserts in his 
Table I that the trial judge cast doubt on the validity of the 
expert's testimony as to the value of lost future earnings by 
referring to it as "pure speculation". The context of the phrase 
"pure speculation" was that plaintiff's counsel asked the witness 
to calculate the plaintiff's lost future earnings by assuming 
plaintiff would earn $6.00 per hour in the first year, $10.00 per 
hour in the second year, $15.00 per hour in the third year and so 
on to a level of $40,000 per year in the tenth year. Defendants 
objected that such incremental increases were without support in 
the evidence. In response to that objection, the court stated: 
It seems to me it is pure speculation that in 
the first year he is going to make $6.00 an 
hour, in the next year $10.00 an hour and the 
next year $15.00 an hour. I think that is 
pure speculation. 
(T. K20). Plaintiff also asserts with regard to Appendix item 2 
that the trial court revealed his opinion of the plaintiff's 
earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 an hour to 
be received. Again, referring to the transcript for the proper 
context, while the trial court sustained the defendants' 
objection with regard to assuming incremental increases in the 
plaintiff's income as being unsupported by the evidence (T. 
K21-22), the court did allow a calculation based upon $5.00 per 
hour, wh:^ -<m<-u^ r ^ * - -^pported h^ - estimony as *-•;) plaintiffs 
earninap : . *- "•'-•* . - T > - - ; • •••• 
testified t-hjt Kne present value of ruture earnings paid ~n -
weekly basis • *- ^ 'X • r -!••-'• 
expectancy wr< 
not attempt : ; *-] m\ • : ; r-r 
regard :i 
assumption.. i ^ p 1 
- h •- r ' i . - o f f 1
 s 3 2 „ 1 y e a r 1 i f e 
t i 1 11 :i f f ' s a 11 o 1:1 1 e \ ::l :i d 
"--jelsvKl any ^. ther f i g u r e s 
. - > r ^ ^ —
 4; ; based on . i n i t i a l 
»;-j - +-hip r e a s o n , t h e r e 
" nasi asser" that the trial J C U I L flowed "oil 
-r.ia 
oimlat .;, , Appendix ih^m r is rharacteri zed bTT plaintiff as 
hit ane of plaintiff* ' witnesses, ] ir»da 
Gummow, 1 ropsychologi^t , was • - .. , . ,;. 
opinion as - s whether y.: . Onyeabor wis unconscious * • trie scene 
• ••>• ' : • . ] 'i- * - - . >u-- : * * ;s comments in 
h* " • . ' :ialoque aad .'othina +-^  do ^ th proper con 
Dr. Gummow 
SfiuW 
r» a ii f i rat i o n s .1? an e x p e r t 
-hf- w- arv: *-o be 
tf'S 
testimony - .-^-dir*.** -< -lie scope o f le-cross. Defendants1 
re-cross examination ^f that witness had been ] imi ted to the 
u 1 1 c o n s c i o u s r • • • . . f ' ' 3 1: e -d i r e c t i 1 1« :;;ii i r y a b o 1 11 " g 1: a d a t :i o n " 
of consciousness va? clearly too broad. 
Q |-By M r # Sykes] What are some of the 
gradations in loss of consciousness t;hat 
might apply ho someone like Mr. 
Onyeabor? 
MR. STEGALL: The. gradation: 
Well, Your Honor, I think she answered 
the question about what she was told, 
and we're getting beyond - -
THE COURT: Yes, I think so. 
MR. STEGALL: - - beyond that question. 
MR. SYKES: Well, I just asked about the 
gradation. Is that a — 
THE COURT: You have had a witness here 
that talked to him immediately after the 
accident. And all she knows about 
whether he experienced any 
unconsciousness or not is what he told 
her. She wasn't there, and she's talked 
to him about it. And she — that's all 
I'm going to let her testify to, as to 
what — based upon what he told her, her 
conclusion was as to whether or not he 
did or did not lose consciousness. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. I have no further 
questions, Your Honor, of this witness. 
(T. H28-31). 
A review of the other Appendix items enumerated above (1-5, 
7-11, 13 and 14) reveal that in the context of the questions, the 
answers, the objections and the statements by the court with 
regard to those objections, the trial court was not commenting 
upon the evidence, but was, rather, ruling upon objections, 
limiting evidence to which objections had been made, or 
clarifying testimony which had been given. 
In addition, to plaintiff's assertions that the trial court 
commented on witness' testimony, plaintiff asserts in his Table I 
that the trial court discredited documentary evidence by making 
disparaging comments about the use of exhibit notebooks given to 
jurors at the beginning of the trial and "severely scolded" 
counsel in front of the jury (Appendix item P m1ie exhibit 
iiotebooks referred to consisted of.loose-1 eaf binders eac 1 i 
containing approximately seventy-six exhibits; the contents were 
approximately two and one-ha 1 £ i nches thick. One such exhibit 
n o t e b o o k w a s g i
 w • B I I
 1l
 "
 :
 '
J : 4::
 * "
!|1
 • • * • i ' Jl • 1 j \ i r o r E> O I : 1 I a t 
reference could be :r • >' t. spe^i.ric exhibits as they were 
admitted. Defendant* ' "-•*:• • • ' apposed '-^ e U ^ P of rhe exhibit 
):OL^S prio j :.-.•: t
 t . imine 
10, 198"" kt that • • - the t? ial judc^ expressed his concern 
T -.ebooks 'jontaineci exnibiLb '-^  ' ^r -".iTht not be received 
and would \ *- d • r>tracti ng to the jury, .*:::?• . : !s couns-.. 
assured ttv. trial court *h.it the exhibit notebooks could be u-j.ed 
: • : i - T h e t r i a ] j i i d g e • I :i ci d e t e r in '; r- ' * * t 
he would permit plaintiff ro use the exhibit notebooks. 
Q55-59) 
r i a . n H f f ' ^ A p p e n d i x i t e in 6 r e 1 a t e s t o c o i 11 r o ] :> f t: 1 I e u s e o f 
those exhibit notebooks by the trial court, Earli er in the day 
durin-: • r. Soderberg' s testimony, reference was made to exhibit 
number J 4 , a written report of the CT examination performed on 
the plaintiff. The i nterchange between plaint j ff's counsel was 
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, that is in the books. 
And if it would be okay I'd like to have the 
jury turn to that for a moment. 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, the Doctor's telling them 
everything that's i n it. I think they can 
follow it. If they want to look at i t it's 
all right. 
JUDGE CROFT: The trouble with them trying to 
read what's in the exhibit is they might miss 
the doctor's testimony. And that's what they 
should hear. 
(T. D325) 
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Soderberg testified that he had 
prescribed a cane for the plaintiff; the prescription was 
received as exhibit number 52 and plaintiff's counsel stated: 
MR. SYKES: I don't know if the jury has that 
in their books. Could they check quickly? 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, it is a prescription for 
a cane. I don't think it's necessary that 
they examine it, they will see it in the jury 
room when they consider the case. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. 
(T. D333) 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's counsel made a reference to 
exhibit 16, which stated in its entirety: "I examined Mr. 
Onyeabor today. He has no health problems. He should be able to 
participate in all school activities." At that point, the 
following interchange occurred: 
MR. SYKES: Okay. If you could turn to 
exhibit 16 again—and may the jury also, Your 
Honor, turn to exhibit 16? 
JUDGE CROFT: If they wish. 
(T. D348) 
On redirect examination, Dr. Soderberg was asked to refer to 
page one of exhibit 51, a four page office chart maintained by 
Dr. Soderberg, ".:ai . plaintiff's counsel asked if the jury 
could refei to the exhibit to which the trial judge replied: 
JUDGE CROFT: If it's helpful. I don't know 
that they need to look at the book every time 
the Doctor says something about the exhibit, 
JJ 
'ill*- wi-n^ss following Dr. Soderberg was Dr. Gerald Moress. 
ri redirect examination the doctor w."is -vsked +~o identify an EMG 
. . • • • ! , e x: 1 i i 1: » i I 5 5 . . - i e c e i p t D f t h e 
exhibit, defendants1 counsel did object to the line of questions 
rea.^ r-iiriQ it ds beuv* hcT^nd the scope of cross-examination. The 
trial court permitt^ : ; . toress to be questioned concern!:! ; 
EMG report lit whicn ooint z'r^ lollowinq occurred: 
MR. SYKES: May we have tt' • . 4 o 
that, Your Honor, to 5 5? 
JUDGE CROFT: Why don't you ask him the 
question and I think the jury can get it 
easier from what the doctor says than they 
can trying to read what the book says. And 
all of you follow what the doctor is saying 
at the same time. 
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, the only reason I do 
that, I think it would be helpful to see and 
he a r at t he s ame t ime. 
JUDGE CROFT: Okay. Let's have an 
understanding that any time the jury wants to 
pick up the book to look at the exhibit that 
the witness is talking about you are free to 
do so, if you don't want to you don't have 
to, 
MR. SYKES: Okay. I think it would be 
• helpful in this case, Your Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: I'd.going to let them make the 
decision because they may not find it that 
way. 
(T. D443-44) 
It is obvious from this history of events that the trial 
judge was concerned the use of the exhibit notebooks was becoming 
distracting to the jury. Nonetheless, after consulting with 
counsel that evening and the following morning, the trial court 
did advise the jurors that they should, at the request of 
plaintiff's counsel, examine the exhibit being testified to. He 
advised them that when the request was made, the jury was to look 
at the exhibit being considered, and when that exhibit was no 
longer needed, to close the exhibit book and not look through it 
further as there might be exhibits that were not yet in evidence. 
(T. E491) That procedure was followed by the court for the 
remainder of the trial. If the jury somehow perceived the trial 
judge's statements in controlling the use of the notebooks as 
disparaging, any such perception was cured by his directions on 
the morning of the fourth day of trial. 
The remaining Appendix item (12) in which a claimed direct 
comment was made occurred during the testimony of Patrick Chukwu. 
Plaintiff states that the trial judge referred to a Nigerian 
witness as "these young ones" thus demeaning the witness and 
other younger Nigerians who had previously testified. Mr. Chukwu 
was the third of three friends testifying for plaintiff; these 
witnesses were Emmanuel Uzoh, age thirty-one years, Robert Otti, 
age thirty years and Mr. Chukwu, age thirty-two years. A review 
of their testimony reveals that all three witnesses tended to 
give lengthy narrative responses to specific questions. For some 
per ioc pr: . * -he .-tatement }.v the trial court, Mr, Chukwu was 
rative
 r e S p o n s e s t o specific questions. 
Objections .da Leen mdvic arrl +-he witness and plaintiff's counsel 
had been cai%*-i.^ n°d \, ; * !. regard to respond inq to the specific 
,:..-!. , . )bl i . " :^ami na/ti 01 1 
of the two prior witnesses. As a re^u1 * , • re +r i -,- judge ' s 
statement that the "vou'io • -^:. -v-^ i • • ™ak^ ^ ^pe^rv1 was i n fact 
an accurate statement. T::- * • • •-> , .._t . ;• - ;;abl} c u i 
unfortunate choice of words by the trial -•idq-, r-. . t is 
nprt-.ii nl y st rp-, .-;.- - • i.>e the term as n^eme5ininglf to Mr. 
Chukwu or to tnr- „t:> . witnesses. 
SUA SPONTE INTERJECTIONS 
. L , *: - t ? '-seven 
occasions : 'r^ o •
 l4 « < ur-f- i t h o t , i H - lt rrial judge 
commented wn Liie eviaenct ! .u^ King JJLJ sooni* :, • er~ ?ct ions = nd 
interruptions. Portions -he tri . . ' . n. "r:r i- - rr x: , 
claimed comments are designated as items ! . through 35 in *-hr> 
Appendix to petitioner s unei. 
A review o^ +-h^G^ portions of the transcript itself reveal 
that many c: *'r-o claimed comments were simply statements made by 
quest-on wn. *:: . .= ; asked. The claimed comments n : ! -a /itni.i 
this category are Appendix Items __, _., 18, 20, 21, 28, JG j..:d 
3 5 • '• ' • . , . ' ' • • 
By way of example, plaintiff asserts with respect to item 16 
ln Table II that the trial.court "interjects comment to help 
defense; scolds plaintiff's expert witness," The interchange in 
question is as follows: 
Q [Mr. Stegall] Were the test scores 
helpful to him if he told you that he 
was 580 and, in fact, was 563? 
A [Mr. Zelig] I don't think there's a 
significant difference between the two 
scores. That's why I didn't pay too 
much attention to it. I think it would 
be an easy mistake to make, because they 
were so close together. 
THE COURT: That doesn't quite answer 
his question, Doctor. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. It is not 
significant to me that there was 
significance in those two scores. 
(T. G95) 
Another such example is Appendix item 17 characterized by 
plaintiff in Table II as the trial court interjecting to help 
defense and questioning plaintiff's expert on the basis of the 
expert's opinion. The interchange in question is as follows: 
Q [By Mr. Stegall] Okay. What did Mr. 
Onyeabor tell you about the jobs he 
held? 
A [By Mr. Heal] He described to me the 
types of activities he performed in 
Nigeria. In terms of estimating jobs or 
working with customers, hiring workers, 
training workers, securing materials and 
equipment, and overseeing construction. 
Q You took those at face value? 
A I suppose. The other information I 
relied on was - -
THE COURT: Just answer the question. 
Did you take them at face value? That 
is the question. 
(T. J187) 
Substantially all of the remaining claimed comments are, 
upon examination, revealed to be proper statements by the trial 
judge to administer in orderly fashion evidence being introduced 
at trial. 
For example, Appendix item 15 is characterized by plaintiff 
in Table II as the trial judge inviting defendants to object to 
an expert's qualifications and casting doubt upon the expert's 
qualifications. A review of the transcript indicates that Dr. 
Nielson testified very briefly concerning his professional 
qualifications. (T. D454) In the interchange between the trial 
judge and counsel complained of by plaintiff, the trial judge 
clarified Dr. Nielson's qualifications to render opinion 
testimony as follows: 
JUDGE CROFT: I assume, Mr. Stegall, you are 
not objecting to lack of qualification 
testimony? 
MR. STEGALL: Your Honor, I understand the 
gentleman is an ENT specialist and— 
JUDGE CROFT: You stipulate he is an expert 
in that field. 
MR. STEGALL: in the field. 
JUDGE CROFT: And can testify without further 
foundation? 
MR. STEGALL: In audiology, Your Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: All right, go ahead, Mr. Sykes. 
(T. D460) 
In Appendix item 19, plaintiff complains that the trial 
judge made a rude interjection implying that plaintiff's counsel 
had suggested an answer to the witness. The transcript reveals 
that plaintiff's counsel had asked a series of leading questions 
with regard to the calculation of the present value of future 
payments. (T. K5-7) The interchange between plaintiff's counsel 
and Mr. Fjelsted preceding the court's statement is as follows: 
Q [By Mr. Sykes] Okay. But just to 
illustrate the principle of how you 
arrive at that, what you are arriving at 
is a discount rate? 
A [By Mr. Fjelsted] Correct. 
Q Is that rate — and I indicated earlier 
my example if you wanted to get $10,000 
of income in ten years — in the tenth 
year, let's say, and you want to know 
how much money, now you need to produce 
that, you have to apply a discount rate? 
A Correct. 
Q And that's why it is a lesser amount of 
money? 
A That is correct. 
Q But you get that discount rate? 
THE COURT: Are you asking him or 
telling him, Mr. Sykes? 
MR. SYKES: Well, you get that discount 
rate by taking the interest rate here 
minus — 
THE COURT: Let him tell you how he does 
it. 
MR. SYKES: All right. 
(T. K8-9) 
Appendix item 24, is characterized by plaintiff as the trial 
judge questioning one of plaintiff's experts as to whether he 
understands certain head injury terms• A review of the 
transcript (T. E494-497) reveals the plaintiff was seeking the 
admission of a video tape and a medical glossary. The glossary 
was to be used by the jury to look up medical terminology used 
both in the video tape and by the witness. The trial judge 
suggested that the witness endeavor to use plain English in his 
testimony rather than have the jury attempt to remember terms and 
look up those terms in a glossary. (T. E495-96) The following 
then occurred: 
Q [By Mr. Sykes] Tell us about the film 
— Who prepared it, when it was prepared 
approximately and this sort of thing. 
A The film was prepared at the University 
of Utah approximately, I'd say, about a 
year ago or within the last year. It is 
viewed predominently toward, for family 
members or people that don't understand 
brain injury and goes over, almost from 
start to finish, of what happens. It 
goes over all degrees of brain injury, 
it describes it and some of the 
consequences and what happens. And it 
shows it very vividly. And I think it 
is a high quality film. Unfortunately, 
a couple places get a little technical 
and that's my only problem with it, Your 
Honor, in one area where they go over 
the anatomy. There is a neuroanatomist, 
Dr. Susan Stenson, who is excellent but 
she uses all the big terms. And I'd be 
glad to define any at that time if it is 
necessary. 
MR. SYKES: Perhaps — 
JUDGE CROFT: Well you understand the 
terms? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: If they need explaining 
you can explain them to the jury, can't 
you? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can. 
(T. E495-97) (Emphasis added). Defendants1 objection to the 
glossary was sustained; the video film was admitted over 
defendants1 objection and was shown to the jury. (T. E498-99) 
From the context, it is evident the trial judge assumed the 
witness was familiar with medical terminology and was clarifying 
for the jury's benefit the fact the witness could help the jury 
understand the video without resorting to a glossary. 
Appendix item 25 is characterized by the plaintiff as the 
trial judge questioning a plaintiff's expert about something 
which "troubled" the trial court regarding the scope of a jury 
decision to decide the case. A review of the transcript reveals 
that the court was properly troubled with regard to a statement 
made by the witness which could have been perceived by the jury 
as meaning the witness expected the jury to make a specific 
finding in favor of plaintiff. When asked about his opinion as 
to whether the plaintiff had compensation syndrome, the following 
interchange occurred: 
A (Dr. Nilsson) Well, his — the majority 
of my interactions have not been typical 
of patients that I have followed who 
have compensation syndrome in the sense 
that he is more concerned that the truth 
be shown, and that he is helped to be 
more reassured of a good future, of 
being able to care for his family. He 
is very angry and he is very frustrated, 
and sees a lot of the court proceeding 
as an expression of that anger. But the 
end result being a validation of yes, 
you are injured and we will help you 
with your problems. 
[THE COURT:] There was one comment 
that the doctor made that troubled me 
just a little bit, and that was that he 
expected this court to make a decision 
one way or another with respect to a 
particular injury. Did I misunderstand 
you, Doctor? 
THE WITNESS: It is not my expectation, 
Your Honor, no. But yet I think from my 
experience, head injury patients in 
general tend to see this as a final 
confrontation of proof. In fact, I have 
some patients who totally will verbalize 
this court will say whether I have a 
head injury or not. And obviously that 
is not the case. 
THE COURT: Your answer wasn't based 
upon the assumption that this court or 
the jury would make any determination on 
that, I guess; is that right? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
(T. J38-39) (Emphasis added.) 
Appendix item 26 is characterized by plaintiff as the trial 
court's interjection to unnecessarily restrict redirect 
examination. Dr. Duncan Wallace, a psychiatrist, had been 
cross-examined by defendants with regard to the fact that Dr. 
Wallace was himself a plaintiff in closed-head brain injury 
litigation. Dr. Linda Gummow, one of plaintiff Onyeabor's 
witnesses, was also a witness in Dr. Wallace's litigation. On 
redirect examination, to rehabilitate Dr. Wallace, the witness 
was asked to distinguish between his injury and that of Mr. 
Onyeabor and was then asked about his own impairments. 
Defendants1 objection was overruled. The witness described his 
impairments and difficulties for several pages of transcript (T. 
F742-44) at which point the complained of interchange occurred: 
Q (Mr. Sykes) Did you have a drop in 
I.Q.? 
A Probably had about a 10 to 12 point 
drop. 
Q What was your I.Q. before the incident? 
JUDGE CROFT: I think that's going a 
little bit far on it, Mr. Sykes. 
MR. SYKES: Wellf I would like to know 
what his I.Q. is now because that does 
relate to the type of report he may have 
written here. 
MR. STEGALL: I think that gets into a 
lot of foundational questions we may not 
be prepared to get into with this 
witness. And — 
MR. SYKES: I will withdraw the 
question, it's not that important. 
JUDGE CROFT: I think he's answered it 
sufficiently. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. 
(T. F744-45) (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff is complaining now of 
testimony his counsel did not feel was important at trial. The 
witness had testified on direct as to his professional 
qualifications (T. E650-52) and on redirect as to his own 
impairments. Inquiry on redirect examination apparently aimed 
solely at bolstering the witness' testimony was properly 
terminated by the court. 
Appendix item 27 is characterized by plaintiff as an 
interjection by the trial judge to attempt to narrow the scope of 
an answer by one of plaintiff's experts. The transcript reveals 
the witness was asked as to the number of his patients; the 
question was ambiguous as to whether it referred to total 
patients or brain injury patients. The trial judge was 
attempting to clarify that ambiguity. (T. J8-9) 
Appendix item 31 is characterized as the trial judge 
"hassling" the witness as to the price of repair of his car's 
left front tire. Two repair invoices (Exhibits 7 and 8) had just 
been received without objection when the following occurred: 
Q (Mr. Sykes) Mr. Onyeabor, did you tell us 
how much the amount of money was in the 
tire -- I don't recall if you said that. 
THE COURT: Well, the exhibit speaks for 
itself. It is about $73,00. 
MR. SYKES: Okay. 
(T. I 102-03) The trial judge was hardly "hassling" the witness 
by properly noting that the exhibit just received spoke for 
itself as to the amount of the tire repair. 
Appendix item 32 is characterized as an interjection by the 
trial judge because he didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to 
testify about the fact he was hard of hearing. The transcript 
reveals that at the close of cross-examination of Mr. Pedersen, 
plaintiff's father-in-law, plaintiff's counsel initially stated 
he had no questions on redirect. The trial judge excused the 
witness at which point the following occurred: 
MR. SYKES: I do have one other quick 
question, if I might. 
JUDGE CROFT: What is it? 
MR. SYKES: Do you have a slight hearing 
problem? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. SYKES: How long have you had it? 
JUDGE CROFT: That doesn't matter. 
THE WITNESS: All my life. 
JUDGE CROFT: Just a moment. 
MR. SYKES: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
(T. D311-12) Notwithstanding the statement of plaintiff's 
counsel that he had one other question, he attempted to ask 
several which were clearly beyond the scope of cross-examination. 
The trial judge was attempting to control questions and answers; 
even so, the question was asked and answered. 
Appendix item No. 33 is characterized by plaintiff as an 
interruption by the trial judge to have evidence admitted before 
plaintiff's counsel had finished laying the foundation therefor. 
A review of the transcript (T. D476-77) reflects that plaintiff 
was seeking the admission of three anatomical drawings (Exhibits 
91, 92 and 93); the three exhibits were within the view of the 
jury as Dr. Goka was asked to explain their relevance. The trial 
court properly suggested to counsel that the three exhibits be 
placed into evidence so they could be considered by the jury. 
All three exhibits were received without objection by defendants. 
(T. D477) 
Exhibit item 35 is characterized by plaintiff as an 
unnecessary "scolding" of counsel on an evidentiary matter. The 
transcript reveals that plaintiff's counsel asked a number of 
foundational questions with regard to certain medical reports. 
(T. D455-56) After having the witness identify the various 
reports but before having them admitted into evidence, 
plaintiff's counsel asked the witness the results of those tests. 
At that point, the following interchange occurred: 
JUDGE CROFT: Well, let's get the tests into 
evidence first, Mr. Sykes. 
MR. SYKES: I'd be happy to do that, Your 
Honor. 
JUDGE CROFT: Well lets do it first. That's 
the proper way to do them. Can you identify 
those four reports by exhibit numbers? 
(T. D456-57) Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel had the various 
reports marked and identified, all of which were received without 
objection. It is clearly evident that the trial judge was not 
"scolding" counsel, but was properly requiring him to follow 
appropriate procedures prior to questioning the witness 
concerning the contents of the exhibits. 
DEMEANOR OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 
Plaintiff contends he was prejudiced by reason of the 
non-verbal conduct, including facial expressions, tone of voice, 
sighs and body language of the trial judge. 
Plaintiff made no objection during the course of the trial 
to any non-verbal conduct of the trial judge; this claim was 
raised by plaintiff for the first time in his motion for a new 
trial. An allegation of impropriety is not timely raised if it 
is first presented as a post-trial motion. State v. Barron, 465 
S.W.2d 523 at 528 (Mo. 1971); Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 
P.2d 1095 at 1101 (1975). In Barron, supra, the defendant in a 
criminal trial asserted in his motion for new trial that during 
the course of alibi testimony, the trial judge "placed his hands 
flat to the side of his head, shook his head negatively once, 
leaned back and swiveled his chair 180 around." Noting that 
such conduct was not revealed by the record and that there was no 
other evidence of its occurrence save the verified motion for a 
new trial, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated: 
However, in any event, at the time appellant 
asserts this incident occurred, no objection 
was made and no relief was requested. The 
alleged action of the trial judge, if it 
occurred, would have the same effect as a 
remark or comment by the trial judge, and the 
rule is concisely stated in State v. 
McCullough, 411 S.W.2d 79, 81 as follows: 
If a party believes the remarks [by the 
court] may prejudice his cause, he 
should object immediately and afford the 
court an opportunity to correct any 
erroneous impression, and the issue is 
not timely presented when raised for the 
first time in a motion for a new trial. 
An accused in a criminal case cannot 
remain silent under the circumstances 
which appellant asserts here occurred, 
and thereby gamble on a favorable 
verdict by permitting the trial to go to 
conclusion without objection, and then 
contend for the first time in a motion 
for a new trial that reversible error 
occurred. [citing cases.] 
465 S.W.2d 523 at 528. 
This same rule was followed by the Supreme Court of 
Washington in Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash. 
127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980). In that case, the defendant 
complained of "body language" by the trial court indicating 
disbelief during the testimony of a number of defendant's 
witnesses. Although the Washington court's statements in this 
regard are discussed by petitioner in his brief at pages 7-8, a 
review of the entire statement by the court is necessary to 
understand the import of that statement as it relates to 
objections to the alleged misconduct. The court's statement in 
full is as follows: 
While the report of proceedings does not 
reflect contemporaneous objections to such 
conduct, concurrent objection is not 
required. Seattle v. Harclaon, 56 Wash. 2d 
596, 598, 354 P.2d 928 (1960), concurring 
opinion of Finley J. Understandably, counsel 
may be reluctant to note such an objection, 
particularly in the presence of the jury, and 
may elect not to object at all if the 
incidents are only occasional and minor. If, 
however, the occurrences were as frequent and 
marked as Crystal Mountain contends, counsel 
should to object to the court's conduct. 
Failure to object denies the trial court an 
opportunity to mitigate the effect of its 
conduct on the jury, when such conduct has 
been inadvertent. Manifest error affecting a 
constitutional right may, of course, be 
raised at any time. RAP 2.5(a)(3). 
Timeliness of objection is not an issue in 
this case because the trial court was 
sufficiently apprised of the matter in the 
motion for mistrial. [The motion for new 
trial was made approximately one-half way 
through the trial]. 
606 P.2d at 1223 (emphasis added). 
In this regard, petitioner complains of the trial court's 
treatment of his exhibit notebooks. As has been noted elsewhere 
in defendants1 brief, the trial judge's statements were made to 
control the use of the exhibit book which had some potential for 
abuse. In any event, when the dissatisfaction of plaintiff's 
counsel with the statement was called to the trial judge's 
attention, the trial judge modified his earlier ruling with 
regard to the use of the notebooks. Thus, in the single instance 
of which there is any indication that Plaintiff's counsel 
objected to what he considered inappropriate conduct by the trial 
court, the trial judge immediately took steps to rectify any harm 
he may have done. 
Neither before nor after the off-the-record conference which 
occurred at the end of the third day of trial, did plaintiff's 
counsel make any objections to comments, either verbal or 
non-verbal, by the trial judge. 
There is nothing in the record before this court which 
identifies any specific instances of non-verbal conduct or which 
specifically describes the conduct or which relates the conduct 
to any event in the written record. If such conduct was 
perceived, plaintiff's counsel should have interposed a timely 
objection thereto so that any perceived problem could be 
rectified and an appropriate record made. Instead, the plaintiff 
first raised complaints concerning the trial judge's conduct in a 
motion for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the specific instances of the comments by and the 
conduct of the trial judge in the context in which made, there is 
no support for plaintiff's contention that he was denied a fair 
trial. Instead, the comments were explanatory and for the 
purpose of clarifying and limiting testimony to that which was 
relevant to the issues before the jury. The plaintiff's 
contentions as to judicial bias were, therefore, without merit 
and the Court of Appeals properly so held. 
